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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S. C. KELSEY and DAVID E.
SORENSEN,
Plaint lj)'s-Appellants,
-vs.C. PHIL HANSEN and
BOB BOYER,
Defendarnts-Respondents.

Case
No.10568

AP·PELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE
This action is brought to require payment of a collateral obligation as appears in an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement wherein one
purchaser under the agreement did not become a grantee
of the real property to which the collateral agreement
applied.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the court. At the close
of plaintiff's case in chief defendant Boyer moved to dismiss. After defendant Boyer had presented his evi1

dence the motion was granted; and an Order was made
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Order of Dismissal
and judgment in their favor as a matter of law, that the
defendant is liable for payment of the collateral obligations under the agreement to purchase.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff-appellant Kelsey negotiated to sell an
apartment building in Clearfield, Utah, to the defendants-respondents, Boyer and Hansen. On September 23,
196f, defendants entered into a written agreement entitled an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" (Exh. 1-P) in which defendants agreed to pay
for certain "extras" including carpets and drapes on
which there were amounts then due and outstanding.
Kelsey at that time agreed to look to both parties for
the payment due on the ''extras.'' The agreement contained the following clauses:
Line 27:
''Contract of Sale or instrument of conveyance to
be made in the name
to be arrarnged
(Last three words were printed in by hand): and
Lines 34 and 35 :

"It is further agreed that execution of the final
contract shall abrogate this Earnest 1\foney Receipt and Offer to Purchase.''

Snbscqnent to the signing of the agreement and without
the knowledge of plaintiff, defendants Hansen and Boyer
11cgotia tcd together and traded properties and separate
interests in properties one with another to the end result that the Clearfield property to be purchased from
plaintiff ·was to he taken in the name of defendant Hansen (Tr. p. 40). The final papers were "arranged" b.v
the defendants in accordance with line 27 of the agreement and without consultation ·with plaintiff. (Tr. p.
40-41) Boyer testified that he received from Hansen
some consideration for allowing Hansen to become the
purchaser of the Kelsey property. (Tr. p.43) At Boyer's
request, plaintiff ·went to defendants' place of business
and was then presented with the prepared deed to the
Clearfield property. (Exh. 2-P) \Vithout receiving explanation as to ·whom the property was to be ronveyed,
he signed it. (Tr. p. 27) Hansen has refused to pay the
obligations for the "extras" and has recently filed his
petition in bankruptcy. (Tr. p. 30) Boyer has refused
payment of any part of the agreement.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff contends that defendant Boyer is obligated
under the purchase agreement for the payment of
the amounts outstanding which were collateral to the
agTeement to convey property even though he did not
hecome a grantee under the deed. He cannot forgive
and then forget his own debt.
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I.

THE PROMISE TO PAY FOR CERTAIN
"EXTRAS" IS A COLLATERAL AGREFJMENT TO THE DEED.

A collateral agreement is designed to take effect
after the execution of the deed. It is generally held that
where the agreement calls for performance of the obligation subsequent to the time that conveyance is to he
made, the intent that the agreement is to survive the
execution of the deed is shown. The doctrine of merger
of the agreement into the deed would not be applira blc
in such a situation. Annotation 38 ALR 2d 1310. rrhe
agreement to pay for the ''extras'' was not incorporated
into the conveyance of the land and remained enforce ahle
as a wholly collateral agreement.
Three Utah cases involving the doctrine of merger
have recognized the general rule and an action on an
antecedent contract Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52
Utah 42, 172 P. 689 (1918), involved an alleged implied
agreement of purchaser to maintain fences. The court
held that the antecedent agreement could only be used
for the purpose of showing a consideration paid by the
purchaser. Since the agreement as to the consideration
was fulfilled the question of consideration was not material. All other covenants were held to have merged in
the deed and recovery was denied. Utah Savings & Trust
Co. v. Stout, 36 Utah 210, 102 P. 865 (1909), involved
covenants in the deed as to title and the executed rontract was fully performed by the execution and delivery
of the deed. See also Reese Howell Co. v. Bro1c11, 48 Ut.
142, 158 P. 684 (1916). These cases are distinguishable'
4

from the case at bar in that they did not involve a collateral and independent agreement which was to be performed subsequent to the conveyance of the property.
However, the Knight case recognizes that matters of consideration must be viewed in the light of the sales agreement and such matters do not merge in the deed as a
matter of law.
The case in question concerns part of the agreed
ronsideration to be paid for consummation of the purchase
agreement. When the purchasers assumed the collateral
obligations they assumed debts which were to be paid in
installments which •vere not then due but became due subsequent to the conveyance. In SA Thompson in Real
Property, § 4458 and an annotation in 84ALR 1041, numerous cases are cited which hold in effect that an agreement to assume a mortgage debt is a collateral and independent agreement and may exist separate from and independently of the deed. Dieckman v. Walser, 114 N.J.
Eq. 382, 168 A. 582 (1933) Affg. 12 N. J. Eq. 46, 163
A. 284.
"There is not, however, a merger of collateral
independent agreements. Where the contract of
sale contemplates a collateral act ... the contract
is not merged into the subsequent deed ... These
collateral agreements in a contract to give a deed
which do not merge in the deed may be treated as
separate covenants on which suit may be brought.
If the sales contract is not essential or germane
to the deed it is not merged in the contract. Contractnral provisions as to the payment of the purrhase price are not merged in the deed and may
suhsequc>ntly be shown by evidence dehors the
deed .... "Annotation 52 ALR 2d 647.
5

The agreement to be deemed collateral and independent so as not to be merged or satisfied in the executio11 of
the deed must not look to or be connected with title, possession, quality or emblements of the land which is suhject of the contract. 1965 Supplement to Thompson ill
Real Property, Vol. 8A, Page 13; Continental Life Insurance Co'. v. Smith, 41 N. M. 82, 64 P. 2d 377 (1936). In the
case at bar the contract obligation is to the payment of
cost of chattels separate from the realty itself. Tlwre
was no merger in the deed of terms which were not fulfilled by delivery of the deed. Fitzpatrick v. AZZ,irrl Construction Co., 24 Ill. 2nd 448, 182 N.E. 2nd 183 (1962).
Delivery of the deed by Kelsey did not constitute
and was not intended to be full performance of the agreement to sell. 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 91 (c) at p. 845. Sec
also Wech v. A & M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. A pp.
2nd 282, 184 N.E. 2nd 758 (1962) and in Shetzen v. C. CJ.
Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E. 2nd 114
(1956) a third party not a party to the deed prevailed in
a case on a collateral agreement of the antecedent
contract.
The purpose of the Kelsey deed was to convey title
to the land in a formal document and was not intended
to describe the terms of the preceding contract under
which the land was sold nor to enumerate the consideration of the transaction. The terms of the contract as
to the payment for certain "extras" are neither contradictory of nor inconsistent 'vith the deed, and the proYisions survive the deed as continuing obligations. (food6

·''J!CCd v. Nichols, 2311\Iich. 308, 204 N.W.122 (1925). rrhe

Restatement of Contracts follows this reasoning. §240(2).
"(2) \Vhere no consideration is stated in an integration, facts showing that there was consideration and the nature of it, even if it was a promise, or any facts that are sufficient to make a promise enforceable, are admissible in evidence and
are operative."
The comment to the restatement suggests that this is
especially true where the writing is of a formal character
and does not lend itself to the inclusion of the whole
agreement.
The same exception as to the obligations of the land
purchase contract not becoming merged in a deed has
been applied to an agreement to pay for certain chattels in State Bank v. Sheldon, 130 Misc. 64, 223 NYS
634 (1927), where the purchasers of a hotel assumed as
part of the purchase price a chattel mortgage on certain
personal property in the hotel. It was held that suoh
assumption and promise to pay was not merged in the
<leed since that instrument related only to real estate
and had no inconsistent agreement as to the chattel
mortgage.
II. THE PURCHASERS "WERE NOT RELEASED FROM COLLATERAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER CONTRACT WHICH
WERE NOT MADE A PART OF THE
SUBSEQUENT DEED.
Plaintiff accepted Boyer as a purchaser and was
Natisfiecl that he could pay the consideration agreed upon
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and outlined in the contract. He did not deal ·with Ha11sen and in fact Boyer signed the agreement for Hmrnr11
and for himself. (Tr. 42 and 43) The terms of the c011tract left "to be arranged" at a future date whom the
purchasers would designate to become the final grantees.
Yet even then Boyer was willing to o bliga tr himself to
the payment of the amounts clue for ''extras.'' Bo.Yer
testified that he obtained some interest in propertirs
from Hansen for giving Hansen the opportunity to take
the Kelsey property in his own name. (Tr. p. 43) Hrn·ing received some benefit from the transaction he cannot now disclaim his obligation by his permitting another
to become the sole grantee. Boyer would be getting all
the enrichment and none of the obligations.
Suppose Boyer assigned his interest to another, hr
would remain liable. Suppose for estate planning rea~ons he wanted a member of his family to become the
grantee, he still would be obligated. The contract would
he abrogated only as to its terms "'hich were contradictory or inconsistent with the subsequent deed. If clefemlant Boyer were to be released of his obligation merely
by his own act of arranging for a different grantee, the
contract would be ineffective from its inception as to the
parties to be charged.
rrhe case at bar is similar to Linbrook Realty CorjJ. Y.
Rogers, 158 Va. 181, 163 S.E. 346, 84 ALR 1035 (193~).
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for thl'
sale of property agreeing to a certain amount of cash and
the assumption by the clef enclant of a deed in trnst illvolYing a mortgage. When the deed was prep<lrc•d the
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llefendant requested that the plaintiff ( instead of conveying property to it, convey to a third party who ''»as
a stranger to the plaintiff. It appeared that plaintiff
·was not acquainted with the terms of the agreement between the defeendant and the third party at the time
the deed was executed. Subsequently there was a default in the payment of the first deed of trust, and the
property was sold at public auction resulting in a deficiency in the plaintiff. It was argued by the defendant
that the contract embracing the results of all the negotiations leading to the execution of the deed, became
merged in the deed and as the deed contained no assumption of the trust deed and was made in the name of the
third party, that therefore the defendant was no longer
liable under the deed. The defendant also claimed that
the conveyance of the property to the third person as
grantee was a novation of the agreement and so the
agreement was superseded. The Court held that to constitute a novation it necessitated the creation of a new
contract by extinguishment of the old. The burden was
on the defendant to prove the establishment of a new
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the
third party, as well as the extinguishment of the relations behveen the plaintiff and the defendant. The true
ronsideration for the agreement was expressed in the
rontract and the deed did not negate that consideration
nor supersede the required consideration under the contract. .Judgment "'as affirmed against the defendant.
In the case of 8tocldon v. Gould, 149 Pa. 69, 24 A.
160 (1892), part of the contract for the exchange of
9

property was that the defendant for himself and his hei 1 ,,
and assigns, assumed and agreed to pay a certain mortgage on the plaintiff's property, and subsequently the
plaintiff conveyed the premises to defendant's son whose
name was inserted in the deed without the plai11tiff 's
knowledge. The deed provided that the conveyance 1rns
"under and subject to the payment of a certain mortgage.'' The court refused to instruct that the conhad,
whereby the defendant agreed to purchase the property,
and assumed for his assigns as well as for himself am1
his heirs, the payment of the mortgage thereon, "'as as
to such provision, merged in the subsequent conveyance
to the defendant's son, and the defendant was hel(1 rPsponsible for the payment of the mortgage even thnu.!.d1
he was not a grantee under the deed.
In Shockley v. Roezz1·, 188 Wis. 564, 206 N.W. s;iG
(1926) Roelli and his wife entered into a written euntraet
with one Olsen for the purchase of certain tracts of
land wherein the Olsens as part of the purchase price
agreed to pay two outstanding mortgages against th0
land. Before the time came for the delivery of a deecl
to the Olsens, they sold the land to Mrs. Ler. Tl1e
Roellis offered to deed to the Olsens, hut they were rl'quested by the Olsens as an accommodation to them, to
name Mrs. Lee as grantee in the deed, and they di 11 so.
and delivered the deed to the Olsens. l\Irs. Lee failed
to pay and foreclosure was begun. It 'vas held that tlte
Olsens, although they 'vere not grantees, we1·e pen;o11nlly
liable for the payment of the mortgage.
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Boyer claims protection from his own unsolicited
t1ct of taking other property from Hansen rather than
be a grantee of the Kelsey property. His mere non-appearance as a grantee does not revoke his obligation to
assume the payments due on the "extras" which were included in the purchase.
CONCLUSION
A written agreement between the seller and the
purchasers for the conveyance of real estate is not executed by and merged in a deed as to collateral and independent stipulations to be performed by the purchasers.
The agreement to convey was not fully performed by the
exerution and delivery of the deed. The formal deed
<lid not set forth the terms of the consideration to be paid.
It did not supersede the stipulations of the purchasing
parties which are collateral to and independent of the
simple conveyance itself. In this case the deed should
he considered as part of the transaction of sale in connection with, and not to the exclusion of the antecedent
contract.
The contract having set forth the obligations of
Royer and Boyer having agreed to those obligations he
remains bound and the fact that he does not become a
grantee under the deed does not relieve him of this burden. He cannot forgive and then forget his own debts.
Respectfully submitted,
M. BYRON FISHER of
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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